Within the last two years I have been involved in several similar meetings with my colleagues from GUUAM countries. The first ones, in New York for example, used to be of an informative nature, but the later ones, at the Universities of Stanford and Harvard were more practically oriented. We discussed concrete plans of cooperation, and not only within GUUAM itself, but also between GUUAM, neighboring countries, and the United States.

Before I speak about specific issues, I would like to draw attention to the fact that during the past several months, especially in light of recent developments within the Post-Soviet space, the existence of GUUAM was brought into question. Fortunately, however, this uncertainty has passed. The time has come again, especially after the Yalta Summit, to discuss how to proceed in our cooperation. Today’s roundtable confirms this trend.

When I mentioned GUUAM’s “to be or not to be” dilemma, I was not merely referring to the formal pact between these five countries. Today, GUUAM is a constituent part of our independence. This, for example, is the only group in which Georgia is a member and Russia is not. I do not mean that GUUAM is an anti-Russian alliance. I want to repeat what I have stated several times at the past GUUAM forums: GUUAM is the closest thing in the post-Soviet space to a strategic relationship, even though the members of GUUAM may not be as adept at the formal constructions of strategies as, say, France, India, or China. But the participants of this meeting should be in no doubt that this is what GUUAM intends to be, at least from my personal perspective. It is a group of states with common problems and threat perceptions, and I hope a common vision of the future. Many are asking: where and what is GUUAM? Is it in- or out of CIS, pro- or anti-CIS or against Russia? Let me answer this question: First of all, GUUAM is beyond CIS but within the Post-Soviet space. It’s neither anti-CIS, nor anti-Russian. It is supposed to be pro-GUUAM strategic relationship.

GUUAM’s birth mother is the CFE negotiations, and its foster mother is NATO. Three of GUUAM members - Ukraine, Azerbaijan and my own country, Georgia - are direct NATO borderlands, sharing common boundaries with Poland and Turkey respectively. Moldova is indirect NATO borderlands, which shares borders with Ukraine and Romania. Our newest member, Uzbekistan, is somewhat more distant, but it is linked to all the others via the emerging Eurasian Transport Corridor, by membership in the PfP programs, by our affiliation with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and by common strategic needs.

As I have mentioned above, GUUAM is not intended to be exclusive or anti-anything. I understand that it is natural for sensible people to conclude that the formation of GUUAM was a defensive reaction to certain undisguised aggressive intentions in our neighborhood, and to some extent this is true. In the beginning, Georgia and Moldova sought to encourage the removal of Russian bases from our countries, and Azerbaijan and Ukraine, alongside the aforementioned countries sought to limit particular kinds of Russian military capabilities that might threaten them, by enforcing the CFE agreements. This process continues, more or less.

Yet, the concept of GUUAM quite naturally leads to pursuing different kinds of security, which will add up in the end to both heightened national security for GUUAM’s constituent parts and to greater collective security. It will also lead to enhanced cooperation, the natural outgrowth of the process. What are these other forms of security that GUUAM should pursue?

First, GUUAM must expand its efforts to promote the economic security of its members in new ways. Each of GUUAM’s states has been badly affected by the economic downturn that followed our independence and, somewhat later, Russia’s and Turkey’s economic collapse. It is clear that economic security is the only foundation on which successful national security can be built. To the extent that this foundation can be built better and more comprehensively through cooperating with one another—for example, through special GUUAM import/export regimes and treaties—and through leveraging our collective weight in the marketplace. With foreign governments, and with international financial institutions, GUUAM could prove to be a powerful locomotive of economic development.

How can this become reality? It is necessary, in my opinion, to create effective mechanisms of economic cooperation, which, first of all, means the creation of a free trade zone within GUUAM in the near future. This will facilitate internal economic development in each of our countries, implementation of international investment programs there and will make it easier for us to be integrated into the world economy.

Second, GUUAM needs to consider how it can promote energy security within its region, and what role GUUAM institutions can play in this endeavor. While we have only one major energy producing state, all GUUAM members are energy transport states, and increasingly all of us will play a larger role in downstream energy projects that benefit the region, Europe, and the larger world energy market.

Third, the members of GUUAM increasingly will be faced with environmental security and disaster management challenges that require collective solutions. Many already exist, for example the myriad environmental security dilemmas associated with Black Sea, or the emerging environmental security threats—for example those associated with burgeoning energy flows—from the development of the Eurasian Transport Corridor. Environmental security problems are among our most acute concerns, and GUUAM is a logical forum for addressing them.

Fourth, GUUAM is an obvious candidate to promote the territorial security of our members from terrorism, narco-trafficking, and the movement of fissile materials that cross our borders. None of us have particularly good border security, although efforts are underway to improve it most places.

In arguing for an expanded definition of security for GUUAM, I seek to attract the attention and cooperation of non-GUUAM states, including Russia, in these larger security issues. Turkey, Romania, and Poland already cooperate with us on many projects, and it is not hard to imagine the emergence of many overlapping security issues that draw in much of Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Black Sea region. As security issues multiply throughout the region, GUUAM could become increasingly attractive as an existing forum located at the vital center of Eurasia.