Ambassador Hafiz Pashayev’s
Presentation at GUUAM Workshop
Stanford University
November 18, 2000

I am very happy to be here today to speak on a topic which is so thrilling for me, and not only for me, I guess. The GUUAM – Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova. This workshop under the auspices of distinguished Stanford University lives up to our expectations. These expectations are that the interest to our countries, shown by the US on the level of political leadership will be seconded by the academic community, creating the atmosphere of public discourse which has to be a part of any foreign policy discussion, if it is to reach any level of prominence.

Since the 1991 we all, the whole world lives in a period of transition. The definition of the “post-cold-war period” is not something lasting. The great powers and small countries alike have to be ready to address a wide new set of multidimensional security issues.

The group of countries called GUAM came into existence during the most intensive discussions on CFE Flank Agreement in mid-nineties, at the time when “Russia first” approach was still dominating US foreign policy, when any sort of political issue was looked at through the prism of development of Russia – US relations. I don]t think we overcame this completely even now and we still witness the same kind of approach here in America on many instances: we keep being called Newly Independent States, or the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, and some analysts still refer to us, on occasion, as Russia’s “backyard.” How long does a sovereign nation have to exist to become just plain State, without adjectives, to disassociate itself from the former regime? I would like to urge decision-makers not to play into the cards of those who never accepted our countries’ independence.

But, back to Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. At that time Azerbaijan and three other states: Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have moved to address their mutual needs and concerns, seeking the Western understanding and assistance. Despite occasional suspicions, the GUAM has not been aimed against any other state. The four of us, indeed, sought US support in either keeping foreign troops out of the region, or getting them withdrawn. By the time the CFE Flank Agreement discussions started to unveil there had been no foreign forces on Azerbaijani soil, with the exception of the so-called “gray area” under Armenian occupation, which currently is not under my Government’s control, and, thus, can host unaccounted TLE (Treaty Limited Equipment). This very “gray zone” has become a factor in the transfers of WMD and sensitive technologies, as well as in drug-trafficking and spread of terrorism. In this context the struggle for power between the “leaders” of the puppet regime of NK also shows the whole world that in this area of instability, which presents a real security challenge for all of us, the proclaimed ideas of separatism have been used to serve ulterior motives of personal enrichment.

So, with the Flank Agreement in 1997 it was not until Vice-President Gore’s last minute phone call to President Aliyev that Azerbaijan agreed to make a compromise on some of its vital interests not to undermine CFE Treaty.

Since that time the GUAM group has passed through a number of important stages in its development, marked by the Joint Communique of the four Presidents, signed in Strasbourg in 1997, accession of Uzbekistan and adoption of Declaration during the Washington Summit in 1999, and signing of a memorandum during the New York Summit of 2000. Besides summits, new dimensions of the GUUAM interaction started to emerge, including cooperation on the level of foreign and defense ministers. The process also went far beyond cooperation on the issues of arms control, expanding to include such areas as national security in general, and also widely defined economic initiatives, including those within the framework of TRACECA project. Regular meetings of national coordinators of the GUUAM countries have become a crucial element of the cooperation, turning into one of the pillars of the group.

CFE-related matters, which were at the cradle of GUUAM, still remain one of the pillars of participating states’ interaction. Currently, as we approach the May 2001 CFE review conference, a number of new issues has arisen. After the OSCE Istanbul summit of 1999 we could already foresee that Russia, despite being cornered into agreeing to withdraw its troops from Georgia and Moldova, would try to avoid full compliance. By redeployment of forces from Georgia to Armenia Moscow continues to build up its military presence in Armenia, and by doing so further complicates uneasy situation in the region. Russia’s policy in the region is aimed, as top military representatives in Moscow have more than once indicated, at staying in the region of South Caucasus. Bilateral military cooperation agreement between Moscow and Yerevan compromises Moscow’s position as a mediator in the capacity of a Minsk Group co-chair. In this regard I would remind that the US, another co-chair, because of inability to fully cooperate with Azerbaijan in military field as a result of infamous congressional restriction (Section 907 of FSA) restrains its military cooperation with Armenia to the same level.

Let me tell you, that it is not only about Kremlin’s aspirations to retain a status of military power, and even not about security of a couple of small states, like Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova. We talk here about integrity of the whole CFE flank zone, about the backbone of the Treaty itself. And I can not but praise resolute and principled approach of both Tbilisi and Cishinau here, which enables the international community to exercise tighter control over Russia living up to its Istanbul obligations.

It is also about the beginning of a qualitatively new dialogue between NATO and GUUAM, which can become one of the pillars of regional security, especially considering the GUUAM countries’ involvement into bilateral ties with the Alliance, and also the role that this dialogue can play in solving the matters of energy pipeline security.

One more thing which I absolutely have to mention is the situation in North Caucasus. Hostilities in Chechnya, as well as complicated political climate in the neighboring republics not only lead to outbursts of brutality and civilians’ suffering, but also, according to Moscow, justify concentration of Russian troops along borders with Georgia and Azerbaijan. By refusing to discuss any limitations as far as these troops are concerned, as alleged sub-limits, Russia makes it clear that it has little intention of curbing its military presence in the region of Caucasus as a whole.

All of our five countries have yet another commonality which I wanted to discuss now. It is settlement of conflicts and conflict –resolution-related activity. The problem is that we, all of us, have conflicts to deal with, either internal, or external in nature. Those conflicts, in all their dimensions – political, economic, security, and social, drive the GUUAM participants to even closer cooperation, be it on conflict-resolution, or peace-keeping. That cooperation includes both studying the nature of conflicts and decrying their roots and influence, as well as bringing together a peace-keeping force on Kosovo. By the year 2001-2002 we hope to achieve a new level of interaction – joint peace-keeping training facility, and a peace-keeping force of a battalion. And our defense minister has already discussed the practical aspects of these issues during the recent meeting of ministers of defense in Kiyev, Ukraine.

I’d like to make a reference to an article written by professor Stephen Blank, and published in the fall issue of World Affairs. Called “American Grand Strategy and the Transcaspian Region,” this article states, and I quote: “…the disproportion between Russia and the smaller Transcaspian states means that no natural equilibrium is possible there… Although this local disproportion in Russia’s favor hardly means that Russia can succeed at will across Central Asia, it does mean that if any regional balance, on energy or other major security issue, is to be achieved, someone else must lend power to the smaller littoral states to anchor that balance. The analysts who argue against any major American involvement fail to understand the tragic situation of the region.”

Based on that insightful quotation, I want to urge you, US scholars, to play your significant role in guiding the US Government towards a greater support of the states of the region, and of GUUAM in particular.

Historically our nations have been passively subjected to the Great Game played out among the powers. Now, to turn the Great Game into Great Gain, it is time for us to become rightful players and we can do so only if united. This is yet another rationale for the GUUAM.

We have to understand that the perspectives for our future are inter-linked and that our effort, too, must be a coordinated one. Which also means that to go through the transition period I have mentioned earlier we have to necessarily think about the security of all, not just individual states.